Numeracy Predicts Accurate Climate Change Knowledge and Beliefs: A Model of Factors That Influence Biases and Polarization by Cho, Jinhyo










NUMERACY PREDICTS ACCURATE CLIMATE CHANGE KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS: 









SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 



























NUMERACY PREDICTS ACCURATE CLIMATE CHANGE KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS: 




A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE 



















Dr. Edward T. Cokely, Chair 
 
Dr. Jorge Mendoza 
 
Dr. Adam Feltz 
 
















































© Copyright by JINHYO CHO 2020 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 
 iv 
Acknowledgements 
 This work would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. I 
would like to express my special regards to Dr. Edward Cokely for continuous guidance and 
encouragement throughout the process. I also would like to thank my committee members, Dr. 
Adam Feltz, Dr. Rocio Garcia-Retamero, and Dr. Jorge Mendoza for offering time and 
constructive comments. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my friends and colleagues of 
the Decision Analytics Lab, the National Institute for Risk and Resilience, and the Risk Literacy 
team for encouragement and inspiration. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my friends and family for 
their love and support. 
  
 v 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ vii 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... viii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
Cultural Worldviews, Biases, and Motivated Reasoning ....................................................... 2 
Numeracy and Knowledge ...................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2: Study 1 ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Participants ............................................................................................................................ 12 
Measure ................................................................................................................................. 13 
Study 1: Analysis and Discussion ............................................................................................. 15 
How Powerful is Knowledge? .............................................................................................. 18 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs .......................................................................... 18 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception ........................................................... 20 
Is Numeracy a Robust Predictor? ......................................................................................... 24 
Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge .................................................................. 24 
Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs ............................................................................ 26 
Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception ............................................................. 27 
Study 1: Summary..................................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 3: Study 2 ........................................................................................................................ 31 
Participants ............................................................................................................................ 31 
Measure ................................................................................................................................. 32 
 vi 
Study 2: Analysis and Discussion ............................................................................................. 33 
How Powerful is Knowledge? .............................................................................................. 37 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs .......................................................................... 37 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception ........................................................... 39 
Is Numeracy a Robust Predictor? ......................................................................................... 41 
Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge .................................................................. 41 
Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs ............................................................................ 43 
Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception ............................................................. 45 
Does Numeracy Predict Relative Risk Attitudes? ................................................................ 47 
Numeracy and Relative Risk Attitudes ............................................................................. 51 
Study 2: Summary..................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 4: General Discussion...................................................................................................... 56 
Knowledge is Power ............................................................................................................. 57 
Numeracy Does Not Polarize................................................................................................ 58 
Limitations and Conclusions................................................................................................. 60 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 62 




List of Tables 
Table 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 12 
Table 3 .......................................................................................................................................... 17 
Table 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 18 
Table 5 .......................................................................................................................................... 19 
Table 6 .......................................................................................................................................... 21 
Table 7 .......................................................................................................................................... 24 
Table 8 .......................................................................................................................................... 26 
Table 9 .......................................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 10 ........................................................................................................................................ 32 
Table 11 ........................................................................................................................................ 35 
Table 12 ........................................................................................................................................ 36 
Table 13 ........................................................................................................................................ 37 
Table 14 ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
Table 15 ........................................................................................................................................ 42 
Table 16 ........................................................................................................................................ 44 
Table 17 ........................................................................................................................................ 46 
Table 18 ........................................................................................................................................ 48 
Table 19 ........................................................................................................................................ 50 
Table 20 ........................................................................................................................................ 51 
Table S1 ........................................................................................................................................ 70 
 
 viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 16 
Figure 2 ......................................................................................................................................... 17 
Figure 3 ......................................................................................................................................... 20 
Figure 4 ......................................................................................................................................... 22 
Figure 5 ......................................................................................................................................... 23 
Figure 6 ......................................................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 7 ......................................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 8 ......................................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 9 ......................................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 10 ....................................................................................................................................... 34 
Figure 11 ....................................................................................................................................... 36 
Figure 12 ....................................................................................................................................... 38 
Figure 13 ....................................................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 14 ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 15 ....................................................................................................................................... 43 
Figure 16 ....................................................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 17 ....................................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 18 ....................................................................................................................................... 48 
Figure 19 ....................................................................................................................................... 50 
Figure 20 ....................................................................................................................................... 53 




Although 97% of experts generally agree that modern global warming is largely caused by human 
activities, some people hold biased, inaccurate beliefs about the causes of climate change and the 
strength of the scientific consensus. Numeracy skills, which are among the strongest predictors of 
decision making quality and risk literacy (i.e., the ability to evaluate and understand risk), 
theoretically should help reduce climate-related biases and polarization. However, some studies 
suggest that numeracy may ironically be associated with small yet significant increases in belief 
biases among people who strongly identify with specific cultural worldviews. While suggestive, 
these studies have not assessed the potential confounds associated with differences in knowledge. 
Accordingly, this paper presents the first two studies to address previous limits and test a cognitive 
model of the structural relations among numeracy, worldviews, knowledge, beliefs, and climate 
risk perceptions. Converging results from Study 1 (i.e., probabilistically representative national 
sample, n = 305) and Study 2 (i.e., diverse adult U.S. residents, n = 537) revealed that numeracy 
is generally associated with robust direct and indirect positive predictive links with climate change 
knowledge, beliefs, and risk attitudes. On average, highly numerate people were about 4 times 
more likely than less numerate people to have accurate knowledge and beliefs, and about 3 times 
more likely to express above average relative risk concerns. Numeracy’s protective influence was 
fully mediated by differences in knowledge, which was by far the strongest predictor of accurate 
beliefs and risks attitudes (e.g., 5-40 times stronger association with knowledge than cultural 
worldviews). Biases associated with cultural worldviews were also found to be largely but not 
entirely mediated by differences in knowledge (e.g., individualists tended to be less knowledgeable 
than egalitarians). Overall, findings are consistent with mechanisms described in Skilled Decision 
Theory and highlight the robust link between numeracy skills (e.g., risk literacy) and acquisition 
of accurate knowledge and beliefs (e.g., representative understanding) that tends to protect against 
cognitive vulnerability and judgment biases. Discussion also considers implications of the lack of 
interactions on attitude polarization, and the need for integrated modeling of cognitive skills and 
knowledge as a routine part of the development of accurate and transparent risk and science 
communication. 
 
Keywords: Numeracy, Risk Literacy, Knowledge, Climate Change
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NUMERACY PREDICTS ACCURATE CLIMATE CHANGE KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS: 
A MODEL OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE BIASES AND POLARIZATION  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The global temperature is more than 1°C higher on average than pre-industrial levels, according 
to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Defined as “an increase in combined surface air 
and sea surface temperatures averaged over the globe and over a 30-year period” (Allen et al., 
2018, p. 51), global warming is likely to have major, enduring implications for many human 
activities including public health, labor, and ecosystems  (e.g., more than $420 billion cost 
projected in 2090; EPA, 2017). Although research suggests that there is strong expert consensus 
about anthropogenic global warming (e.g., 97%), some people have inaccurate beliefs about 
climate change and scientific consensus, which could have major social and economic 
consequences (e.g., personal and public risk action for mitigation; Hayhoe et al., 2018; Leiserowitz 
et al., 2020). Research suggests that factors such as cultural worldviews may enhance polarization 
in risk attitudes via motivated reasoning processes that bias information searches, reasoning, and 
decision making. Ironically, although cognitive skills (e.g., numeracy) generally promote more 
accurate knowledge and beliefs, some initial evidence has suggested that numeracy may interact 
with cultural worldviews to enhence biases.  If correct, this interaction could potentially promote 
rather than protect against the acquisition of biased knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes about climate 
change (Kahan et al., 2012, 2017). To date, however, although knowledge is a well-established 
determinant of accurate climate beliefs and judgments, research has yet to assess the role of climate 
change knowledge in studies linking numeracy and biases (Ding et al., 2011; Hornsey et al., 2016; 
Kobayashi, 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015c). Will numeracy protect 
against or further promote the polarizing effects of cultural worldviews in more comprehensive 
studies that include assessments of the powerful influence of climate change knowledge?  
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Cultural Worldviews, Biases, and Motivated Reasoning 
According to the Cultural Theory of Risk, people’s cognitive processes may often be 
influenced by the degree to which people identify themselves with specific cultural worldview 
orientations (e.g., hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982). Although there are nuanced and varied interpretations, the theory broadly holds that cultural 
worldviews are functionally similar to psychological notions of human values that tend to be 
related to robust differences in motivational goals (Corner et al., 2014; Steg & Sievers, 2000; van 
der Linden, 2015c). Accordingly, research has demonstrated that brief psychometric scales 
designed to measure trait-like cultural worldviews and value orientations may help explain 
differences in judgments and attitudes about diverse risks and related issues (e.g., climate change 
beliefs). For example, when considering risks of various environmental issues (e.g., global 
warming, nuclear power) research suggests that individualism and hierarchy may generally be 
associated with moderately polarized lower perceived risk as compared to the somewhat higher 
than average perceived risks reported by participants with egalitarian worldviews (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Jones, 2011; Xue et al., 2014).  
Theoretically, among other influences, differences in cultural worldviews may in some 
cases be linked to biased cognitive processing via mechanisms of motivated reasoning. In this 
context, motivated reasoning refers to the notion that people’s deeply held desires, values, and 
beliefs may consciously or unconsciously bias various aspects and stages of cognitive processing 
in ways that protect and promote specific conclusions, regardless of the accuracy of resulting 
implications, beliefs, or conclusions (Kunda, 1990). For example, Kahan and colleagues (2011) 
examined the relationship between cultural worldviews and processing of new information in the 
context of expert consensus about diverse risks including global warming. Participants were given 
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vignettes where fictional experts from different domains (i.e., global warming, gun control, nuclear 
waste) systematically expressed their expert opinions about each risk in ways that were either 
congruent or incongruent with typical worldview beliefs or attitudes (e.g., systematically presented 
expert opinions as higher/lower risk, independent of actual expert consensus or ecologically valid 
claims). When participants were then asked to rate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that the 
described expert was trustworthy and knowledgeable, participants’ evaluation was found to be a 
partially predictable product of the congruency between the reported experts’ position and one’s 
purported cultural worldview. For instance, when the fictional expert suggested that the risk of 
global warming was high, a higher percentage of egalitarian communitarians agreed that the expert 
was both trustworthy and knowledgeable, as compared to the lower-than-expected ratings reported 
by hierarchical individualists (Kahan et al., 2011).  
While the function of cultural worldviews is not necessarily associated with cognitive 
biases, previous empirical research findings and related theory has suggested that biased motivated 
reasoning processes may often amplify bias and polarized attitudes. It has been further suggested 
that the potential influence of motivated reasoning may be especially likely to manifest whenever 
biased processing is necessary to protect or enhance one’s own identity as a member of a 
worldview group (Kahan et al., 2007, 2011, 2017; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Thus, people who 
report identifying as hierarchical individualists, and who in turn benefit from this affiliation, may 
be more likely to increase biased information acquisition via motivated reasoning, thereby 
amplifying the strength of their own biased understanding and agreement about inaccurate facts 
(e.g., “I’ve seen multiple experts and politicians on the news say that climate change isn’t caused 
by humans so there can’t be consensus among scientists”).  In contrast, individuals who identify 
more as communitarian egalitarians may be likely to develop more polarized views that reflect 
 4 
their own self-serving biases and inaccurate beliefs, which may exaggerate the strength of the 
evidence in the opposite way (e.g., “every qualified climate scientist that appears in my social 
media feed always agrees without exception”).  
Taken together, the research suggests that individuals’ cultural worldviews may be usefully 
described as fundamental values that tend to manifest as relatively stable, quantifiable 
psychological traits. As such, brief psychometric instruments designed to measure these traits can 
predict people’s judgments, beliefs, and risk attitudes in meaningful ways. At an extreme, theory 
and data also indicate that individuals who have strongly held cultural worldviews may be more 
vulnerable to biases and attitude polarization that often results from motivated cognition in part 
because they have a greater stake in rejecting information that threatens their strongly held values 
and identity.  As such, they may be especially likely to engage in processes that promote biases 
and polarization when faced with contentious issues. 
Numeracy and Knowledge 
Recent research and experiments indicate that having knowledge about the existence of 
expert consensus regarding anthropogenic global warming tends to causally reduce biases and may 
limit polarization among climate change risk attitudes of educated adults (Lewandowsky et al., 
2013; van der Linden et al., 2015c). Given the importance and influence of accurate knowledge, it 
seems likely that skills and experiences associated with knowledge acquisition and effective 
reasoning should be likely to have meaningful associations with individual differences in climate 
science knowledge. For example, statistical numeracy skills (e.g., practical probabilistic math and 
reasoning skills) have been found to be among the single best predictors of general decision 
making skills and risk literacy (i.e., the ability to evaluate and understand risks) among educated 
individuals (Cokely et al., 2012, 2018; Ghazal et al., 2014). In addition to many examples of the 
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benefits of numeracy for effective reasoning, decision making, and knowledge acquisition in 
socially and economically important domains (e.g., health, wealth, relationships), there is also a 
small number of recent studies showing beneficial associations between numeracy and decision 
making in climate and weather domains.  For instance, numerate individuals are less vulnerable to 
myths (i.e., widespread but incorrect information based on folk science) about tornadoes (Allan et 
al., 2017). A study that examined the judgment of people who lived in areas vulnerable to tornado 
events suggested that numerate individuals tended to be less likely to believe in inaccurate 
knowledge about tornadoes and effective personal risk mitigation strategies (i.e., tornado myths).  
Similarly, a study on flood risk literacy indicated that numeracy predicted having more knowledge 
about the risks of floods and the benefits of various risk mitigation strategies. A subsequent study 
found that some key benefits of flood risk literacy followed primarily from the fact that people 
with higher numeracy skills tended to identify and acquire more accurate knowledge about future 
flood risks as compared to less numerate individuals from the same region (Ramasubramanian et 
al., 2019). 
According to Skilled Decision Theory, numeracy skills, particularly those associated with 
statistical numeracy and probabilistic reasoning, are thought to confer benefits via skilled cognitive 
and affective heuristic deliberation processes. Although heuristic and intuitively-grounded 
reasoning processes can in some cases promote biased reasoning and knowledge acquisition, the 
profound benefits of integrated knowledge and representative understanding are generally so 
important for decision making that they tend to outshine any risks (e.g., a child who has diligently 
practiced chess for 10 years is much more likely to make good chess-related decisions compared 
a Nobel prize winning scientist who is only a novice chess player). For example, research has 
shown that numeracy skills tend to be associated with differences in the precision and clarity of 
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one’s memory of objective information and of one’s subjective feelings about the risks, as has 
been demonstrated in the link between many kinds of risky prospect evaluations such as ignoring 
a heart attack, maximizing financial returns, understanding social norms, and selecting medical 
treatments (Newall, 2016; Petrova et al., 2017; Reyna et al., 2009). Numeracy has also been found 
to predict adaptive self-regulation and skilled metacognitive processing (e.g., thinking about your 
own thoughts and feelings, and more accurately evaluating the thoughts and feelings of others) as 
revealed in studies showing more strategic deliberation during risky decision making, more vivid 
encoding and personalization of practical and emotional context of decision problems, and more 
accurate self-assessment of knowledge, skills, and decision outcomes (e.g., overconfidence 
vulnerability; Cokely & Kelly, 2009; Ghazal et al., 2014; Ybarra, 2018). In turn, these factors often 
work in concert with basic probabilistic math knowledge, which tends to promote more precise 
and efficient interpretation and evaluation of technical information about risks and trade-offs 
(Cokely et al., 2012, 2018; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006; Petrova et al., 
2017).  
The constellation of skills associated with numeracy and risk literacy generally tends to 
facilitate the acquisition of valuable, accurate, and relevant domain-specific knowledge, both in 
more common situations and given rapidly evolving high-stakes issues like pandemic responses 
(Downs et al., 2008; Pennycook et al., 2015, 2020; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; Sarathchandra et 
al., 2018). For example, numerate people are more knowledgeable about specific financial 
products (e.g., loans, credit cards), they tend to be more educated, they have more knowledge about 
specific scientific and legal facts, and they often have a more nuanced understanding of common 
health and lifestyle risks (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). Numerate individuals also tend to 
have more accurate knowledge about local and national social and cultural norms (e.g., what 
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behavior is socially appropriate at work vs. leisure settings), and may be better able to estimate the 
prevalence of many kinds of cognitive and social biases in other people (e.g., Ybarra, 2018). 
Although there is relatively less research on the acquisition of valuable domain-specific and 
domain-general knowledge, evidence suggests that more numerate people may be better at 
evaluating the quality of information and risk communications, and numerate people may also tend 
to more accurately evaluate the potential payoff of different types of deliberation and problem 
solving activities, so they tend to more adaptively invest their limited cognitive resources and 
select strategies in such a way as to deliberately and deeply encode relevant information in highly 
contextualized and durable representations, which tend to be much more resilient against the 
effects of forgetting (e.g., Cokely et al., 2006, 2009, 2018; Feltz & Feltz, 2019; Mahmoud-Elhaj 
et al., 2020).  
Numeracy and Motivated Reasoning 
Despite the considerable evidence showing that numeracy tends to be one of the strongest 
predictors of skilled decision making and risk literacy, some studies suggest that within some 
controversial or politically-charged domains numeracy may potentially be associated with non-
normative judgments and biases (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Kahan et al., 2011, 2012). For 
example, a study by Kahan et al. (2012) suggested that numeracy had a very small, yet significant 
interaction with worldviews such that highly numerate people with specific cultural worldviews 
may express greater risk attitude polarization, consistent with a motivated reasoning hypothesis. 
In the study, participants were categorized into four groups (i.e., two worldview groups with 
opposing views − hierarchical individualists and communitarian egalitarians − with low or high 
cognitive skill) and their perception of global warming risk was examined. The results indicated 
that the gap between the two cultural worldview groups in global warming risk perception did not 
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decrease, but instead the relationship between numeracy and worldview appeared to interact. That 
is, numerate individuals with extreme worldviews showed more, not less polarization in risk 
attitudes.  Of note, while the results are suggestive, one potential confound that has received 
relatively little attention concerns the extent to which the observed differences in risk attitudes do 
indeed reflected fundamental differences in non-normative judgments (e.g., selecting a more 
expensive fixed rate loan because you underestimate the benefits of the available adjustable rate 
loan), as compared to differences in risk attitudes that may follow from established well-ordered 
risk preferences (e.g., deliberately selecting the more expensive loan because you value the 
certainly of a fixed cost). 
Other research using related approaches also suggests that numerate individuals may have 
more polarized risk attitudes, which could theoretically follow from more skilled use of self-
serving (motivated) reasoning in accord with one’s worldviews (Kahan et al., 2017). For example, 
in a study by Kahan et al. (2017), participants were provided with a piece of statistical information 
(i.e., a contingency table) with results from fictional studies on two different issues (i.e., skin rash 
cream and gun control). Participants were then asked to select a conclusion that they believe the 
given evidence supports. The results reported that highly numerate individuals tended to give more 
polarized answers when they were given information about gun control (a more polarizing topic) 
as compared to skin rash cream (a less polarizing topic). The results further suggested that less 
numerate participants were less likely to demonstrate this polarizing pattern. Together, this might 
reflect a pattern of logically inconsistent reasoning (e.g., applying different standards to different 
topics). Alternatively, if people who care about gun control were also more likely to know more 
about research on gun control policies and studies (compared to skin care products), then it 
becomes harder to simply interpret differences in responses as non-normative biases.  That is, it 
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seems reasonable that people who know more or less about a topic could logically come to different 
judgements about the relative risks or values of different policies.  In this case, differences in 
knowledge could have had even stronger influences on judgments because the evidence depicted 
presented relatively weak, and only marginally significant results from a fictional study (e.g., the 
outcome data was significant for one tail but not two tailed test, which would be required if you 
truly had no prior hypothesis about an outcome). Our ability to accurately evaluate the logic or 
biases of different people becomes much more complicated in the presence of such a strong 
potential confound.   
Taken together, while the majority of available research on numeracy suggests that 
numeracy skills tend to promote more resilient, skilled and accurate decision making and 
knowledge acquisition, some research suggests that these relations may not necessarily hold for 
some climate-related judgments that appear to be affected by small but significant interactions 
between numeracy, worldviews, beliefs and risk attitudes.  Theoretically, researchers suggest that 
these findings of potentially non-normative biases may indicate that numerate individuals 
generally tend to use their cognitive skills in the climate change domain in a self-serving manner, 
such that they may selectively search for, encode, and interpret available evidence in ways that 
support or protect a viewpoint that is most consistent with their cultural worldview. Whether or 
not the effects actually represent non-normative biases, the evidence indicates that in some 
situations there may be a surprising relationship between numeracy, worldviews, beliefs and 
attitudes. Nevertheless, all available studies suggesting these potential biases have neglected 
potential confounds related to potentially influential differences in knowledge, which could be 
confounded with reported differences or interactions with worldviews, beliefs, and attitudes (Table 
1). 
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Table 1  





Value Knowledge Belief 
Downstream 
consequence 
Kahan et al., 2017 ✔️ ✔️   ✔️ 
Kahan et al., 2012 ✔️ ✔️   ✔️ 
van der Linden et al., 2015  ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Ding et al., 2011  ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Kahan et al., 2011  ✔️ ✔️ ✔️  
Lewandowsky et al., 2013  ✔️ ✔️ ✔️  
Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017  ✔️ ✔️ ✔️  
van der Linden et al., 2012  ✔️ ✔️  ✔️ 
Kobayashi, 2018   ✔️ ✔️  
Note. The table presents previous research that studied the climate change domain, and that were 
cited in the current investigation. Values include cultural worldview or ideology. Downstream 




Despite a growing body of evidence investigating the various interrelations among 
numeracy skills, knowledge, values, beliefs, and attitudes, there is a gap in the current literature. 
To date there do not appear to be any publicly available scientific studies reporting integrated tests 
of the interrelations among numeracy, cultural worldview orientations, climate science knowledge, 
climate change beliefs, and risk attitude. Given this and other gaps in the current literature, one 
primary aim of the current set of studies was to provide the first integrated test of the robustness 
of the relations between numeracy, knowledge, worldviews, and downstream beliefs and attitudes, 
conducting a direct test of the extent to which differences in beliefs and attitudes may generally be 
associated with protective versus polarizing influences of skills and knowledge. Specifically, 
Study 1 assessed and tested a structural cognitive model of the interplay of the primary variables 
(i.e., numeracy, worldview, climate knowledge and beliefs, and risk attitudes) using a 
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probabilistically representative sample of the U.S. adult population. In Study 2, I replicated and 
extended the assessment and test of the cognitive model using a convenience sample of diverse 
adult residents in the United States, in order to provide an out-of-sample cross-validation test of 
the integrated model, and in order to more precisely address emerging concerns about 
measurement of climate change risk perceptions without assessing differences in general risk 
perceptions (e.g., how risky is climate change compared to other risks in general).  
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Chapter 2: Study 1 
In order to provide a robust test of numeracy’s relationship to accurate or polarized views 
on climate change, this study uses a probabilistically representative sample to construct the first 
model that integrates numeracy, expert consensus, belief about anthropogenic global warming, and 
global warming risk perception. 
Participants 
The representative sample of the U.S. population was collected in spring of 2016, using a 
probability-based sampling panel (KnowledgePanel® from GfK). A total of 305 cases were 






National Census Estimate  
(2016) 
Gender   
   Male 53.4% 49.2% 
   Female 46.6% 50.8% 
Age   
   18-34 27.5% 27.4% 
   35–44 19.3% 12.7% 
   45-64 39.3% 26.2% 
   65+ 13.8% 14.5% 
Education   
   Less than High School 11.8% 13% 
   High School 31.1% 27.5% 
   Some College 26.6% 21% 
   Bachelor and beyond 30.5% 30.3% 




The Berlin Numeracy Test and a three-item scale created by Schwartz et al. (1997) were 
used to assess numeracy and risk literacy (Cokely et al., 2012). Using the two tests together 
increases sensitivity of the measurement, allowing for a wider range of skill assessment. 
Expert Consensus Knowledge 
Knowledge in expert consensus about anthropogenic global warming was assessed by 
asking the extent to which participants agreed with the statement that most experts believe that 
greenhouse gases cause increases in global temperature (i.e., According to most experts, are 
greenhouse gases, such as those resulting from the combustion of coal, oil, natural gas, and other 
materials, causing average global temperatures to rise?). The scale ranged from 0 (Strongly 
disagree) to 10 (Strongly agree). 
Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) 
Belief in anthropogenic global warming (AGW) was measured with an item asking the 
degree to which participants agreed with the statement that they personally believe greenhouse 
gases cause an increase in global temperature (i.e., In your view, are greenhouse gases, such as 
those resulting from the combustion of coal, oil, natural gas, and other materials, causing average 
global temperatures to rise?). The scale ranged from 0 (Strongly disagree) to 10 (Strongly agree). 
Global Warming Risk Perception 
Perceived risk about global warming was measured with one item: How much risk do you 
think global warming poses for people and the environment? The scale ranged from 0 (No Risk) 
to 10 (Extreme Risk).  
Cultural Theory 
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The 12-item scale from previous studies (e.g., Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994; Jones, 2011; 
Ripberger et al., 2011, 2012; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990) was used to measure four indices of 
cultural theory: individualism (Cronbach’s  = .54), egalitarianism (Cronbach’s  = .76), 
hierarchy (Cronbach’s  = .67), and fatalism (Cronbach’s  = .58; See Table S1). Each index was 
composed of three statements. Respondents rated the degree to which they agree with each 
statement, from a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).1 The mean rating for the 




1 One of the items for fatalism had a negative correlation with the other two, so the item was excluded. The 
reported Cronbach’s 𝛼 is after the exclusion. 
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Study 1: Analysis and Discussion 
 Eighty-four percent of participants agreed that there is a consensus among experts about 
anthropogenic global warming (i.e., answered 6 or more out of 10; M = 6.75, SD = 2.55). 
Furthermore, 61% of respondents indicated that they believe in anthropogenic global warming (M 
= 6.01, SD = 2.87). Together, this indicates that a majority of respondents may already have beliefs 
consistent with those of experts. Figure 1 presents the proportion of individuals that agree with the 
existence of expert consensus, believe in anthropogenic global warming, and have above-average 
global warming risk perceptions by age group. Though statistical numeracy was significantly 
correlated with knowledge in expert consensus (r = .16, p < .001; see Table 3), numeracy was not 
significantly correlated with belief in anthropogenic global warming or risk perceptions about 
global warming. These findings are consistent with previous research on the relationship between 
cognitive sophistication (e.g., numeracy) and attitudes about COVID-19 risks (Pennycook et al., 
2020). Further, 50% of respondents displayed higher risk perceptions about global warming (M = 




Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perception  
An integrated model was constructed based on findings from previous studies. Specifically, 
previous evidence indicates that numeracy tends to be related to the acquisition of accurate 
knowledge, which in turn predicts beliefs and attitudes about risks (e.g., global warming; Cokely 
et al., 2018; Hornsey et al., 2016; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015b, 2015c, 
2017, 2019) 2. As such, a structural equation model that integrates numeracy, knowledge, belief, 
and risk perception was constructed using the lavaan package in R version 3.5.2 (see Figure 2). 
Four cultural worldviews and demographics (i.e., age, gender) were included as covariates. 
Indirect effects were estimated using a bootstrapping method with 5,000 bootstrap samples (see 
Table 4). The model had a good fit: χ2(2) = .56, p = .76, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, SRMR = .00, 
RMSEA = .00 with 90% C.I (0.00-0.08).   
 
2 Interaction effects were tested but were not robust in the presence of main effects. 
Note. The plot represents the percentage of respondents that (i) agreed with the existence of 
expert consensus knowledge, (ii) personally believe in anthropogenic global warming, (iii) 
indicated above-average global warming risk perception, by age group. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
 
Figure 2 
 An Integrated Model of Numeracy, Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perception 
 
Note. Reported are standardized coefficients after adjusting for age and gender. The representation 
does not include paths from hierarchy and fatalism, which were as follows: Hierarchy → 
Knowledge (𝛽 = .01, p = .91), Hierarchy → Belief (𝛽 = .01, p = .94), Hierarchy → Risk Perception 
(𝛽 = .07, p = .09), Fatalism → Knowledge (𝛽 = .04, p = .61), Fatalism → Belief (𝛽 = .12, p < .05), 
Fatalism → Risk Perception (𝛽 = .05, p = .69). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
  Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 1. Perceived Risk 6.15 2.88 —       
 2. Belief in AGW 6.01 2.87 .80** —      
 3. Expert Consensus 
Knowledge 
6.75 2.55 .66** .68** —     
 4. Numeracy 2.70 2.02 .00 .04 .16** —    
 5. Individualism 3.61 0.97 -.35** -.33** -.26** .02 —   
 6. Egalitarianism 3.41 1.21 .39** .39** .28** -.14* -.17** —  
 7. Hierarchy 3.33 1.05 .01 -.02 -.06 -.17** .32** .13* — 
 8. Fatalism 2.93 1.11 .14* .17* .06 -.15* .17* .31** .27** 






























Indirect Effects (Standardized Coefficients) of Key Variables 
 
As seen in Figure 2, the model indicated that expert consensus knowledge was the strongest 
predictor of belief in anthropogenic global warming (AGW; 𝛽 = .59, p < .001). Independent of 
belief, knowledge of expert consensus also had a direct effect on global warming risk perception 
(𝛽  = .20, p < .001). Numeracy further predicted expert consensus knowledge, independent of 
cultural worldviews and demographic variables (𝛽 = .20, p < .001). As seen in Table 4, numeracy 
had a significant indirect effect on both (i) belief in anthropogenic global warming and (ii) risk 
perceptions, mediated by knowledge.  
How Powerful is Knowledge? 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs 
To better understand the predictive power of knowledge on belief in anthropogenic global 
warming, a binary logistic regression model was constructed (see Table 5). The dependent variable 
was dichotomized to represent whether an individual believed in anthropogenic global warming 
or not (i.e., a rating between 0 and 5 was recoded as Disagree or neutral (0); a rating between 6 
and 10 was recoded as Agree (1)). Predictor variables included expert consensus knowledge, 
cultural worldviews, and demographic variables. For interpretability, expert consensus knowledge 
was also dichotomized to represent whether one agreed with the existence of expert consensus 
Path Estimate SE 
Bootstrapped 
95% CI 
Knowledge → Belief → Risk Perception .36*** .06 .28 .53 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief .12** .05 .08, .27 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Risk Perception .04* .03 .02, .11 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief → Risk Perception .07* .03 .04, .17 
Note. Effects were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap samples.  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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about anthropogenic global warming or not (Rating 0 to 5 = Disagree or neutral (0); Rating 6 to 
10 = Agree (1)).  
Table 5 
Binary Logistic Regression on Climate Change Beliefs 
As seen in Table 5, results indicated that expert consensus knowledge was indeed a 
significant predictor. The odds ratio for knowledge was 16.08 with 95% CI [7.85, 32.96], 
indicating that the odds of agreeing with anthropogenic global warming tend to be roughly 16 
times larger among individuals that agree with the existence of expert consensus, as compared to 
those who do not. 
To better illustrate the relationship between expert consensus knowledge on global 
warming beliefs, the predicted probability of belief in anthropogenic global warming was plotted 
with respect to scores on expert consensus knowledge. This is presented for three different cultural 
worldview groups: the national average, individualist, and egalitarians (see Figure 3). A binary 
logistic regression model was used, where expert consensus knowledge and the four cultural 
worldviews were predictor variables. Given the diverse groups, the criteria assumed that 
individualist (egalitarian) score at 1 standard deviation above the mean, and egalitarianism 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Knowledge 2.78*** 0.37 57.54 16.08 7.85, 32.96 
Individualism -0.28 0.18 2.41 0.76 0.53, 1.08 
Egalitarianism 0.36** 0.14 7.01 1.43 1.10, 1.87 
Hierarchy 0.03 0.16 0.04 1.03 0.76, 1.41 
Fatalism 0.23 0.15 2.44 1.26 0.94, 1.69 
Age 0.03** 0.01 8.54 1.03 1.01, 1.05 
Gender 0.31 0.31 1.01 1.36 0.75, 2.47 
Note. The dependent variable was belief in anthropogenic global warming dichotomized to 
represent whether one agrees or does not agree (0-5 vs. 6-10). Expert consensus knowledge was 
dichotomized to represent whether one agrees or does not agree with the existence of expert 
consensus (0-5 vs. 6-10).  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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(individualism) score at 1 standard deviation below the mean. The other two variables were held 
at their mean. The predictions were generated using a bootstrap with 1,000 simulations.  
Figure 3 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability for belief in anthropogenic global warming at 
different levels of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined 
as having individualism (egalitarianism) at least 1 standard deviation above the mean, while also 
scoring at least 1 standard deviation below the mean on egalitarianism (individualism). All other 
worldview indices were held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals 
from 1,000 bootstrap iterations. 
 
The results indicate that for all three groups, as agreement with the existence of expert 
consensus knowledge increases, the probability of agreement with anthropogenic climate change 
also increases. This is consistent with suggestions from previous studies that emphasized the role 
of expert consensus knowledge in shaping beliefs on climate change (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; 
van der Linden et al., 2015). 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception 
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Following previous analyses, a binary logistic regression was conducted to better 
understand the predictive power of expert consensus knowledge on global warming risk perception. 
Global warming risk perception was recoded as a binary outcome variable to represent whether an 
individual displayed above average global warming risk perception (Rating 0 to 6 = Below mean 
(0); Rating 7 to 10 = Above mean (1)). Predictor variables were expert consensus knowledge, 
cultural worldviews, and demographic variables.  
Table 6 
Binary Logistic Regression on Global Warming Risk Perception 
As seen in Table 6, the results suggest that expert consensus knowledge was a significant 
predictor. The odds ratio for knowledge was 9.93 with 95% CI [4.85, 20.35], suggesting that the 
odds of having global warming risk perception above average tends to be almost 10 times larger 
among individuals that agree with the existence of expert consensus, as compared to those who do 
not. 
Again, predicted probabilities of having above-average risk perception for global warming 
at each score of expert consensus knowledge were simulated for three different groups: the national 
average, individualist, and egalitarians (see Figure 4). A binary logistic regression was used for 
prediction. Global warming risk perception was the outcome variable, after being dichotomized to 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Knowledge 2.30*** 9.93 39.37 9.93 4.85, 20.35 
Individualism -0.56** 0.57 9.69 0.57 0.41, 0.81 
Egalitarianism 0.51*** 1.66 14.28 1.66 1.28, 2.17 
Hierarchy 0.08 1.08 0.27 1.08 0.80, 1.47 
Fatalism 0.02 1.02 0.01 1.02 0.76, 1.35 
Age 0.03** 1.03 8.56 1.03 1.01, 1.05 
Gender -0.11 0.89 0.16 0.89 0.51, 1.57 
Note. Dependent variable was global warming risk perception dichotomized to represent 
whether one has risk perception above the mean of the current sample (0-6 vs. 7-10). Expert 
consensus knowledge was dichotomized to represent whether one agrees or does not agree with 
the existence of expert consensus (0-5 vs 6-10).  *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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represent whether an individual had above-average global warming risk perception. Expert 
consensus knowledge and the four cultural worldviews were used as predictor variables. The 
predictions were generated using a bootstrap with 1,000 simulations. The individualist (egalitarian) 
group was assumed to have individualism (egalitarianism) at 1 standard deviation above the mean, 
and egalitarianism (individualism) at 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other two 
variables were held at their mean.  
Figure 4 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability for having above-average global warming risk 
perception at different levels of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) 
were defined as having individualism (egalitarianism) ratings 1 standard deviation above mean, 
and egalitarianism (individualism) ratings 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other 
worldview indices were held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals 
from 1,000 bootstrap iterations. 
The results indicate that as agreement with existence of expert consensus knowledge 
increases, the probability to have increased global warming risk perception also increases. Of note, 
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the mean differences in trend between the three groups was also greater, as compared to the 
previous analysis which predicted belief in anthropogenic global warming. 
To illustrate the relative contribution of knowledge and the cultural indices on beliefs and 
risk perception about global warming, the proportion of variance explained by each of the variables 
was calculated from two linear regression models predicting global warming beliefs and risk 
perception, respectively, with expert consensus knowledge and four cultural worldview indices as 
predictor variables (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 
Comparison of Proportion of Variance by Knowledge and Main Cultural Worldview Indices   
 In both cases, expert consensus knowledge explained a larger proportion of variance than 
individualism or egalitarianism. This is consistent with the notion of knowledge is power 
suggested by Skilled Decision Theory (Cokely et al., 2018).  
Note. Proportion of variance in each of the outcome variables (e.g., global warming beliefs and 
risk perception) explained by expert consensus knowledge and cultural worldview indices are 
presented. Multiple linear regression models with expert consensus knowledge and cultural 
worldview indices as predictor variables were used. In both cases with belief and risk 
perception as an outcome variable, proportion of variance explained by knowledge exceeded 
that of main cultural worldview indices.   
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Is Numeracy a Robust Predictor? 
Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge 
In the integrated model, numeracy predicted expert consensus knowledge, independent of 
cultural worldview indices ( = .20, p < .001). To better understand the relationship between 
numeracy and expert consensus knowledge, a binary logistic regression was constructed (see Table 
7). Expert consensus knowledge was used as an outcome variable after being recoded into a binary 
variable to represent whether one agrees with the existence of expert consensus in anthropogenic 
global warming or not (0-5 = Disagree or neutral (0); 6-10 = Agree (1)). In this model, statistical 
numeracy was used as a predictor variable along with cultural worldviews and demographic 
variables.  
Table 7 
Binary Logistic Regression on Expert Consensus Knowledge 
As seen in Table 7, results indicated that statistical numeracy was a significant predictor, 
with odds ratio of 1.35 with 95% CI [1.16, 1.58]. Accounting for the continuous nature of the 
numeracy scale (scores between 0 and 7), this indicates that individuals with the highest numeracy 
score are approximately 8 times more likely to have expert consensus knowledge, as compared to 
that of individuals with the lowest numeracy score.  
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.30*** 0.08 14.11 1.35 1.16, 1.58 
Individualism -0.45** 0.16 8.17 0.64 0.47, 0.87 
Egalitarianism 0.51*** 0.14 13.62 1.67 1.27, 2.20 
Hierarchy 0.09 0.15 0.42 1.10 0.83, 1.46 
Fatalism 0.02 0.14 0.02 1.02 0.78, 1.33 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.19 1.00 0.99, 1.02 
Gender -0.28 0.28 0.95 0.76 0.44, 1.32 
Note. Dependent variable was expert consensus knowledge dichotomized to represent whether 
one agree or not agree with existence of expert consensus (0-5 vs. 6-10). *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001 
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The predicted probabilities for knowledge of expert consensus of anthropogenic global 
warming across different levels of numeracy and cultural worldview groups were generated (see 
Figure 6). Following the standard method, a bootstrapped binary logistic regression model was 
used for prediction, where the outcome variable was expert consensus knowledge after being 
dichotomized to represent whether one agrees with the existence of expert consensus in 
anthropogenic global warming or not (0-5 = Disagree or neutral (0); 6-10 = Agree (1)). 
Figure 6 
Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability of indicating that there is expert consensus about 
anthropogenic global warming. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined as having 
individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and egalitarianism 
(individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview indices were 
held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
 
The results illustrate that when numeracy is high, the predicted probability for agreement 
with expert consensus tends to be similar, even among different cultural worldview groups. 
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Consistent with Skilled Decision Theory, this implies that numeracy may in fact predict reduced 
biases in knowledge, despite different cultural worldviews. 
Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs 
Another binary logistic regression predicting belief in anthropogenic global warming was 
constructed with the same set of predictor variables: numeracy, cultural worldviews, and 
demographics (Table 8).  
Table 8 
Binary Logistic Regression on Climate Change Beliefs 
As seen in Table 8, the odds ratio for numeracy was 1.27 with 95% CI [1.11, 1.46], 
indicating that individuals with the highest numeracy score are nearly 5 times more likely to agree 
with anthropogenic global warming, as compared to those with the lowest numeracy score. 
Following from the previous analyses, predicted probabilities for belief in anthropogenic 
global warming (see Figure 7) were modeled with respect to numeracy scores. Again, a 
bootstrapped binary logistic regression model was used for prediction. 
  
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.24*** 0.07 11.67 1.27 1.11, 1.46 
Individualism -0.45** 0.15 8.60 0.64 0.47, 0.86 
Egalitarianism 0.54*** 0.13 18.41 1.71 1.34, 2.19 
Hierarchy 0.12 0.14 0.68 1.12 0.85, 1.48 
Fatalism 0.20 0.13 2.36 1.22 0.95, 1.58 
Age 0.02** 0.01 7.85 1.02 1.01, 1.04 
Gender 0.19 0.27 0.48 1.20 0.72, 2.03 
Note. Dependent variable was belief in anthropogenic global warming dichotomized to represent 
whether one agree or not agree with anthropogenic global warming (0-5 vs. 6-10). *p < .05, **p 
< .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 7 
Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability of believing in anthropogenic global warming at 
different levels of numeracy and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined 
as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and egalitarianism 
(individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview indices were 
held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
The results illustrate that as numeracy increases, so does the probability of accurate beliefs 
both for egalitarians and individualists. Contrary to some previous suggestions, there is no 
evidence of numeracy causing polarizing beliefs in climate change (i.e., motivated reasoning). 
Accordingly, these findings are consistent with Skilled Decision Theory (Cokely et al., 2018). 
Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception 
Even though the results of the integrated model (Figure 2) indicated that the relationship 
between numeracy and global warming risk perception is fully mediated by expert consensus 
knowledge, the relationship between numeracy and risk perception were examined using a binary 
logistic regression model (see Table 9). The outcome variable of the model was whether one 
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displayed global warming risk perception above the mean, generated by dichotomizing the global 
warming risk perception variable (0-6 = below mean (0) vs. 7-10 = above mean (1)). The predictor 
variables were statistical numeracy, cultural worldviews, and demographic variables. 
Table 9 
Binary Logistic Regression on Global Warming Risk Perception 
 As shown in Table 9, numeracy was a statistically significant predictor of whether one 
shows above average global warming risk perception. The odds ratio of numeracy was 1.15 with 
95% CI [1.01, 1.31]. When individuals with lowest versus highest numeracy scores are compared, 
the odds of having above average global warming risk perceptions were approximately 2.7 times 
larger among more numerate individuals. 
To visualize the relationship with numeracy and global warming risk perception, predicted 
probabilities for above average global warming risk perception were generated with bootstrap 
simulation with 1,000 iterations, across a range of numeracy scores for three different worldview 
groups (Figure 8).  
  
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.14* 0.07 4.18  1.15 1.01, 1.31 
Individualism -0.64*** 0.16 15.83 0.53 0.39, 0.72 
Egalitarianism 0.64*** 0.13 24.68 1.89 1.47, 2.44 
Hierarchy 0.11 0.14 0.58 1.12 0.84, 1.48 
Fatalism 0.01 0.13 0.00 1.01 0.78, 1.31 
Age 0.03** 0.01 8.52 1.03 1.01, 1.04 
Gender -0.18 0.26 0.48 0.83 0.50, 1.40 
Note. Dependent variable was global warming risk perception dichotomized to represent 
whether one has risk perception above the mean of the current sample (0-6 vs. 7-10). *p < .05, 
**p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 8 
Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability of having above-average global warming risk 
perception at different levels of numeracy and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) 
were defined as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and 
egalitarianism (individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview 
indices were held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 
bootstrap iterations. 
 As numeracy score increased, the probability to have above-average risk perception 
showed an increasing trend for all three worldview groups. However, this implies that there may 
be relatively constant differences in risk perceptions between individualists and egalitarians. 
Previous research may explain this as numeracy tends to have an indirect effect on risk perceptions 
via more general knowledge or beliefs, which were not included in the model (Ramasubramanian, 
2020).  
Study 1: Summary 
In accord with recent studies, I found that a majority of people (61%) tend to already have 
accurate knowledge and beliefs about global warming. The first test of an integrated model that 
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includes numeracy, knowledge, belief, and risk perception was conducted using a probabilistically 
representative national sample. Here I document that numeracy directly predicted accurate 
knowledge, and numeracy had indirect effects on key outcomes such as belief and risk attitudes 
(i.e., downstream consequences), independent of cultural worldviews. The downstream benefits 
of numeracy are relatively robust and consistent (see Figure 9). Furthermore, knowledge was a 
powerful predictor of belief and risk perception, accounting for more than 10 times more variance 
in climate change beliefs as compared to each of the cultural worldview indices (e.g., 
individualism, egalitarianism).  
Figure 9 
Numeracy, Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perception 
Note. Each bar represents the relative magnitude of the odds ratio at three different scores of 
numeracy (i.e., low = 0, mid = 3, high = 7) for (i) having expert consensus knowledge, (ii) 
belief in anthropogenic global warming, and having above-average global warming risk 
perception. The results were based on three binary logistic regression models all of which had 
numeracy and cultural worldviews as predictor variables.  
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Interestingly, no evidence for polarization was observed. Although the integrated model 
indicated that numeracy had an indirect effect on risk perceptions via knowledge and beliefs, there 
was no direct relationship between numeracy and risk perception on a zero-order correlation. In 
fact, many of the studies that previously documented the polarizing role of numeracy focused only 
on risk perception. However, they also did not assess a potentially influential prior, namely, 
general risk perception or relative risk perception (i.e., how much worse is climate change 
compared to other risks such as nuclear power). In theory, as numerate individuals may acquire 
more knowledge on diverse risks, there may be a difference in general risk perception. Thus, Study 
2 was designed to test whether assessing general risk perception can help explain a relationship 
between numeracy and domain-specific risk perception (i.e., global warming risk perception). 
 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
In Study 2, I introduced general risk perception as a new variable to the integrated model. 
A convenience sample of diverse adults in the United States was collected in 2020. Many previous 
studies that examined the relationship between numeracy and domain-specific risk perception have 
not assessed general risk perception, which may help estimate relative differences in risk 
perception (e.g., global warming risk perception as compared to risk perception about other diverse 
risks). Thus, a main goal of Study 2 was to test whether assessing relative risk perception can 
explain the relationship between numeracy and global warming risk perception. The same methods 
and analyses from Study 1 were conducted to replicate key findings, while also including measures 
for the new variable: general risk perception. The subsequent analyses included integrated models 
with general risk perception as a function of numeracy.  
Participants 
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The data was collected via Amazon Mechanical Turk in 2020 April, during the early phases 
of the COVID19 pandemic in America. Out of 1,043 cases, 537 were used for the analysis after 
excluding the respondents who took too little time, did not pay attention to the survey (as assessed 
by attention checks), or completed less than 90% of the survey elements (see Table 10 for 
demographic characteristics). 
Table 10 
Demographics of Study 1 and Study 2 Sample 
Categories Study 1 (2016) Study 2 (2020) 
Gender   
   Male 53.4% 43% 
   Female 46.6% 57% 
Age   
   18-34 27.5% 45% 
   35–44 19.3% 22.2% 
   45-64 39.3% 24.4% 
   65+ 13.8% 8.2% 
Education   
   Less than High School 11.8% 0.1% 
   High School 31.1% 9.6% 
   Some College 26.6% 27.9% 
   Bachelor and beyond 30.5% 61.6% 
 
Measure 
All of the same measures from Study 1 were included in Study 2. This includes: (i) 
Statistical Numeracy, (ii) Expert Consensus Knowledge (iii) Belief in Anthropogenic Global 
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Warming (iv) Global Warming Risk Perceptions, and (v) Cultural Theory3. In this study, one 
additional facet was measured: Domain-general risk perception. 
Domain-general Risk Perception 
Domain-general risk perception items were assessed using the format developed by Kahan 
et al., (2017) “How much risk do the following pose for human health, safety and prosperity?”. 
Questions used a scale from 0 (No Risk at All) to 7 (Extremely High Risk). The five risks included 
(i) motor vehicles, (ii) skiing, (iii) alcohol, (iv) nuclear power, and (v) vaccination, which were 
measured in study of Fischhoff et al. (1978). The mean of the five items with a linear conversion 
was conducted to match the scale of global warming risk perception, which ranged from 0 to 10. 
The Cronbach’s 𝛼 after the conversion was .69. 
Study 2: Analysis and Discussion 
Over 90% of participants agreed that there is a consensus among experts about 
anthropogenic global warming (M = 8.17, SD = 1.90). Over 90% of respondents also indicated that 
they believe in anthropogenic global warming (M = 7.86, SD = 2.29), indicating that a majority of 
respondents may already have belief consistent with those of experts. The mean global warming 
risk perception rating was also higher than the scale midpoint (M = 7.80, SD = 2.16), indicating a 
skewed distribution, such that people on average tend to display higher risk perception about global 
warming. Figure 10 presents the proportion of individuals that agree with the existence of expert 
consensus, believe in anthropogenic global warming, and have above-average global warming risk 
perception by age group. As in Study 1, statistical numeracy was significantly correlated with 
knowledge in expert consensus (r = .13, p < .01; see Table 11). Numeracy was not significantly 
 
3 As in Study 1, only the two of three items for fatalism were used in analyses for consistency with Study 1. 
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correlated with belief in anthropogenic global warming or global warming risk perception, which 
is consistent with findings from Study 1. 
Following the procedure from Study 1, an integrated model was tested, which was built 
based on assumptions of previous studies indicating that numeracy tends to predict accurate 
knowledge, which in turn often predicts downstream consequences such as beliefs and risk 
attitudes (see Figure 11). The model had good fit: χ2(2) = 1.22, p = .54, with CFI = 1.00, TLI = 
1.00, SRMR = .004, RMSEA = .00 with 90% C.I (.00-.07). 
  
Figure 10 
Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perception 
 
Note. The plot represents the percentage of respondents that (i) agreed with existence of expert 
consensus knowledge, (ii) agreed with anthropogenic global warming, (iii) indicated above-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































An Integrative Model of Numeracy, Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perception 
 
Table 12 
Indirect Effects (Standardized Coefficients) of Key Variables 
Path Estimate SE 
Bootstrap 
95% CI 
Knowledge → Belief → Risk Perception .32*** .05 .26, .46 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief .08** .03 .03, .16 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Risk Perception .02 .01 .00, .06 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief → Risk Perception .04** .02 .01, .08 
Note. Effects were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
As seen in Figure 11, the model again suggested that expert consensus knowledge was the 
strongest predictor of belief in anthropogenic global warming (𝛽 = .63, p < .001), having direct 
and indirect effects on global warming risk perception, mediated by belief in anthropogenic global 
warming. Numeracy also predicted expert consensus knowledge (𝛽 = .13, p < .01) independent of  
Note. Reported are standardized coefficients after adjusting for age and gender. The representation 
does not include paths from hierarchy and fatalism, which were as follows: Hierarchy → 
Knowledge (𝛽  = -.09, p = .09), Hierarchy → Belief (𝛽  = .04, p = .30), Hierarchy → Risk 
Perception (𝛽 = .04, p = .20), Fatalism → Knowledge (𝛽 = .04, p = .37), Fatalism → Belief (𝛽 = 


























cultural worldviews and demographic variables (i.e., age, gender). Estimated indirect effects 
presented in Table 12 suggest that numeracy has significant indirect effects on belief via 
knowledge. The indirect effect to risk perception was significant when knowledge and belief were 
mediators.  
How Powerful is Knowledge? 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs 
A binary logistic regression model predicting whether one believes in anthropogenic global 
warming or not, was constructed to examine the predictive power of expert consensus knowledge 
(Table 13). The outcome variable was the dichotomized expert consensus knowledge variable (i.e., 
whether one agrees with existence of expert consensus or not), while cultural worldviews and 
demographics were predictor variables.  
Table 13 
Binary Logistic Regression on Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming 
 
As seen in Table 13, expert consensus knowledge was a statistically significant predictor. 
The odds ratio for knowledge was 48.89 with 95% CI [19.26, 124.11]. The odds of having above 
average global warming risk perception tends to be nearly 50 times larger among individuals that 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Knowledge 3.89*** 0.47 66.98 48.89 19.26, 124.11 
Individualism -0.51** 0.19 7.55 0.60 0.42, 0.86 
Egalitarianism 0.67*** 0.13 26.34 1.95 1.51, 2.52 
Hierarchy 0.22 0.16 1.87 1.25 0.91, 1.73 
Fatalism 0.09 0.16 0.31 1.09 0.80, 1.50 
Age -0.03** 0.01 8.50 0.97 0.95, 0.99 
Gender -0.61 0.33 3.51 0.54 0.29, 1.03 
Note. Dependent variable was belief in anthropogenic global warming dichotomized to represent 
whether one agrees or does not agree with anthropogenic global warming (0-5 vs. 6-10). Expert 
consensus knowledge was dichotomized to represent whether one agrees or does not agree with 
the existence of expert consensus (0-5 vs. 6-10). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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agree with the existence of expert consensus, than those who do not. Although there were relatively 
higher rates of belief in anthropogenic global warming as compared to Study 1, knowledge still 
emerged as a strong predictor of beliefs.  
Predicted probabilities for belief in anthropogenic global warming for the three cultural 
groups were plotted across a range of scores on expert consensus knowledge (Figure 12). Using 
the same method as in Study 1, a bootstrapped binary logistic regression model was used. For the 
bootstrapped regression, the means and standard deviations from Study 1 (i.e., probabilistically 
representative sample) were used. 
Figure 12 
Knowledge and Climate Change Beliefs 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability for belief in anthropogenic global warming at 
different levels of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined 
as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and egalitarianism 
(individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview indices were 
held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
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 Consistent with results from Study 1, as agreement with the existence of expert consensus 
increased, so did the predicted probability to believe in anthropogenic global warming. This is 
consistent with suggestions from previous studies emphasizing the role of knowledge in shaping 
beliefs about climate change (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015c). 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception 
Next, a binary logistic regression model was tested for global warming risk perceptions. 
The variable was recoded so that responses between 0 and 7 were coded as Below average (0) and 
responses between 8 and 10 were coded as Above average (1) (Table 14).  
Table 14 
Binary Logistic Regression on Global Warming Risk Perception 
 As shown in Table 14, the odds ratio for knowledge is 25.31 with 95% CI [7.32, 87.57]. 
This indicates that the odds of having above-average global warming risk perception tends to be 
25 times higher among those with knowledge of expert consensus than those without. 
The predicted probabilities for having above average global warming risk perception for 
three different cultural worldview groups were plotted across a range of scores for expert 
consensus knowledge. For the bootstrapped regression, the means and standard deviations from 
Study 1 (i.e., probabilistically representative sample) were used (Figure 13).  
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Knowledge 3.23*** 0.63 26.04 25.31 7.32, 87.57 
Individualism -0.46** 0.14 10.48 0.63 0.48, 0.84 
Egalitarianism 0.69*** 0.10 49.31 1.99 1.64, 2.42 
Hierarchy 0.06 0.12 0.23 1.06 0.84, 1.34 
Fatalism 0.20 0.12 2.90 1.22 0.97, 1.53 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.99, 1.02 
Gender 0.16 0.22 0.50 1.17 0.76, 1.79 
Note. Dependent variable was global warming risk perception dichotomized to represent 
whether one has risk perception above the mean of the current sample (0-7 vs. 8-10). Expert 
consensus knowledge was dichotomized to represent whether one agrees or does not agree with 
the existence of expert consensus (0-5 vs 6-10). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Figure 13 
Knowledge and Global Warming Risk Perception  
 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability for having above-average global warming risk 
perception at different levels of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) 
were defined as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and 
egalitarianism (individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview 
indices were held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 
bootstrap iterations. 
Finally, the predictive power of knowledge and two main cultural worldview indices were 
compared using two linear regression models predicting (i) belief in anthropogenic global warming 
and (ii) global warming risk perception, with expert consensus and the four cultural worldview 
indices as predictor variables (Figure 14). The proportion of variance explained by knowledge and 
main cultural worldviews were graphed. Knowledge explained more variance than either cultural 




Comparison of Proportion of Variance by Knowledge and Main Cultural Worldview Indices   
Is Numeracy a Robust Predictor? 
Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge 
As in Study 1, statistical numeracy emerged as a predictor of expert consensus knowledge 
independent of cultural worldview and demographic variables. Expert consensus knowledge again 
fully mediated the relationship between numeracy and belief. As seen before numeracy had a 
significant indirect effect on belief in anthropogenic global warming and global warming risk 
perception.  
Again, the relationship between numeracy and knowledge was examined using a binary 
logistic regression. The expert consensus knowledge variable was dichotomized to represent 
whether one agrees with existence of expert consensus or not (Table 15).   
Note. Proportion of variance in each of the outcome variables (e.g., global warming beliefs and 
risk perception) explained by expert consensus knowledge and cultural worldview indices are 
presented. Multiple linear regression models with expert consensus knowledge and cultural 
worldview indices as predictor variables were used. In both cases with belief and risk 
perception as an outcome variable, proportion of variance explained by knowledge exceeded 
that of main cultural worldview indices.   
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Table 15 
Binary Logistic Regression on Expert Consensus Knowledge 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.18* 0.10 3.78 1.20 1.00, 1.45 
Individualism -0.13 0.18 0.58 0.88 0.62, 1.23 
Egalitarianism 0.69*** 0.14 23.71 2.00 1.51, 2.64 
Hierarchy -0.09 0.16 0.33 0.91 0.67, 1.25 
Fatalism 0.01 0.18 0.00 1.01 0.71, 1.43 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.16 1.01 0.98, 1.03 
Gender 0.03 0.32 0.01 1.03 0.55, 1.93 
Note. Dependent variable was expert consensus knowledge dichotomized to represent whether 
one agrees or does not agree with existence of expert consensus (0-5 vs. 6-10). Median split was 
used to divide participants into two level of numeracy (low vs. high). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
< .001 
As seen in Table 15, the result indicated that odds ratio for numeracy was 1.20 with 95% 
CI [1.00, 1.45], suggesting that the odds of having knowledge of expert consensus is about 3.5 
times higher for individuals with the highest numeracy score, as compared to those with the lowest 
numeracy score. 
Again, the predicted probability for expert consensus knowledge was modeled using a 
binary regression model. For the bootstrapped regression, the means and standard deviations from 




Numeracy and Expert Consensus Knowledge 




Note. Results depict the predicted probability of indicating that there is an expert consensus about 
anthropogenic global warming. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined as having 
individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and egalitarianism 
(individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview indices were 
held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
The plot suggests evidence of a ceiling effect. This is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics that over 90% of respondents already had accurate knowledge, belief, and risk 
perceptions for global warming. This is true at an even a larger degree than what was seen in Study 
1. Still, the predicted probability for the three groups displayed an increasing trend. 
Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs 
Another binary logistic regression predicting belief in anthropogenic global warming was 
conducted (Table 16). Belief in anthropogenic global warming was used as an outcome variable 
after being dichotomized. 
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Table 16 
Binary Logistic Regression on Belief in Anthropogenic Global Warming 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.14† 0.08 3.42 1.15 0.99, 1.34 
Individualism -0.43** 0.16 7.73 0.65 0.48, 0.88 
Egalitarianism 0.80*** 0.12 45.97 2.23 1.77, 2.81 
Hierarchy 0.13 0.14 0.88 1.14 0.87, 1.48 
Fatalism 0.07 0.14 0.25 1.07 0.81, 1.42 
Age -0.02* 0.01 4.96 0.98 0.96, 1.00 
Gender -0.45† 0.27 2.74 0.64 0.37, 1.09 
Note. The dependent variable was belief in anthropogenic global warming dichotomized to 
represent whether one agrees or does not agree with anthropogenic global warming (0-5 vs. 6-
10). †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Statistical numeracy showed a near-significant trend (perhaps because of the observed 
ceiling effects). The odds ratio for knowledge was 1.15 with 95% CI [.99, 1.34], indicating that 
the odds of agreeing with anthropogenic global warming tend to be roughly 2.7 times larger among 
individuals with the highest numeracy score as compared to those with the lowest numeracy score. 
Predicted probabilities for belief in anthropogenic global warming across numeracy scores 
were plotted (Figure 16). For the bootstrapped regression, the means and standard deviations from 




Numeracy and Climate Change Beliefs 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability for believing in anthropogenic global warming at 
different levels of knowledge and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) were defined 
as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and egalitarianism 
(individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview indices were 
held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 bootstrap 
iterations. 
The plots again indicate a ceiling effect, especially among egalitarians. This may be 
because a large proportion of respondents already agreed that there is expert consensus about 
anthropogenic global warming. The result indicates that as numeracy score increases, an increasing 
trend for the national average group and individualist group can be expected. 
Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception 
A binary logistic regression model predicting whether one has above-average global 
warming risk perception was constructed in the same way. The outcome variable was whether 
one’s global warming risk perception was below or above average, which was generated by 
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dichotomizing global warming risk perception variable (0-7 = Below average (0); 8-10 = Above 
average (1)). See Table 17 for results.  
Table 17 
Binary Logistic Regression on Global Warming Risk Perception 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.06 0.06 1.15 1.06 0.95, 1.19 
Individualism -0.41** 0.13 9.93 0.66 0.51, 0.86 
Egalitarianism 0.77*** 0.10 64.63 2.16 1.79, 2.60 
Hierarchy 0.03 0.11 0.06 1.03 0.83, 1.28 
Fatalism 0.18 0.11 2.64 1.20 0.96, 1.50 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.13 1.00 0.99, 1.02 
Gender 0.09 0.21 0.17 1.09 0.72, 1.65 
Note. Dependent variable was global warming risk perception dichotomized to represent whether 
one has risk perception above the mean of the current sample (0-7 vs. 8-10). *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001 
Although numeracy was not a significant predictor of above-average global warming risk 
perception in this study, the model was significant, and the results are still interpreted: the odds of 
individuals with the highest numeracy score to have above-average risk perception is roughly 1.5 
times larger than those with the lowest numeracy score. 
The predicted probabilities for above average global warming risk perception were 
modeled (see Figure 17). The outcome variable was a dichotomized version of global warming 
risk perception, representing whether one’s global warming risk perception was below or above 
average (0-7 = Below average (0); 8-10 = Above average (1)). The means and standard deviations 




Numeracy and Global Warming Risk Perception 
Average and Cultural Worldview Group 
 
 
Note. Results depict the predicted probability of having above-average global warming risk 
perception at different levels of numeracy and cultural worldviews. Individualists (egalitarians) 
were defined as having individualism (egalitarianism) 1 standard deviation above mean, and 
egalitarianism (individualism) 1 standard deviation below the mean, while the other worldview 
indices were held at their mean. The shaded area represents 90% confidence intervals from 1,000 
bootstrap iterations. 
 
Similar to trends observed in the same analysis of Study 1, the results indicated that those 
with extreme cultural worldview indices tend to display perceptions that are more consistent with 
views associated with their cultural worldview. Again, it may be because numeracy has an indirect 
effect on risk perceptions via knowledge and beliefs. 
Does Numeracy Predict Relative Risk Attitudes? 
Using Structural Equation Modeling, a new model integrating domain general risk 
perception was tested. For an exploratory purpose, a model without covariates (i.e., cultural 
worldview, demographics) was tested first (Figure 18). Indirect effects were estimated based on 
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bootstrap with 5,000 samples (Table 18). The model fit was as follows: χ2(4) = 18.32, p = .00, 
with CFI = .99, TLI = .96, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .08 with 90% C.I [0.05-0.12]. RMSEA was 
close to mediocre, but the other indices were satisfactory (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011; 
MacCallum et al., 1996). 
Figure 18 
A Structural Equation Model with Domain General Risk Perception without Covariates 
 
Table 18 
Indirect Effects (Standardized Coefficients) of Key Variables 
Note. Effects were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Path Estimate SE 
Bootstrap 
95% CI 
Knowledge → Belief → Global Warming Risk Perception .45*** .06 .38, .62 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief .09** .04 .04, .18 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Global Warming Risk Perception .02 .01 .00, .05 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief   
   → Global Warming Risk Perception 
.06** .02 .02, .11 
Numeracy → General Risk Perception  
   → Global Warming Risk Perception 




















Note. Reported are standardized coefficients. Covariates (i.e., cultural worldview and 
demographic variables) were not included in the current model. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
< .001. 
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Consistent with the model in Study 1, expert consensus knowledge was the strongest 
predictor of belief in anthropogenic global warming (β = .73, p < .001), and had a direct effect on 
global warming risk perception. Numeracy predicted expert consensus knowledge, independent of 
cultural worldviews and demographic variables (β = .13, p < .01). The results further indicate that 
numeracy is negatively related to domain general risk perception (β = -.30, p < .001), which in turn 
is positively related to global warming risk perception (β = .17, p < .001). The relationship between 
numeracy and global warming risk perception is fully mediated by domain general risk perception. 
A model with the same structure but with covariates (i.e., cultural worldview, 
demographics) was tested next (Figure 19). Indirect effects were estimated based on 5,000 
bootstrap samples (see Table 19). Numeracy was still negatively related to domain general risk 
perception ( = -.20, p < .001), which was positively related to global warming risk perception ( 
= .13, p < .001). The relations were independent of cultural worldviews and demographic variables. 
The model had a good fit: χ2(4) = 8.04, p = .09, with CFI = 1.00, TLI = .97, SRMR = .02, RMSEA 
= .04 with 90% C.I (0.00-0.09). 
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Figure 19 
A Structural Equation Model with Domain General Risk Perception and Covariates 
Table 19 
Indirect Effects (Standardized Coefficients) of Key Variables 
Path Estimate SE 
Bootstrap 
95% CI 
Knowledge → Belief → Global Warming Risk Perception .32** .05 .26, .46 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief .08** .03 .03, .17 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Global Warming Risk Perception .02 .01 .00, .05 
Numeracy → Knowledge → Belief  
  → Global Warming Risk Perception 
.04** .02 .01, .08 
Numeracy → General Risk Perception  
  → Global Warming Risk Perception 
-.03*** .01 -.05, -.01 
Note. Effects were estimated with 5,000 bootstrap samples. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
.21*** .09 
Note. Reported are standardized coefficients after adjusting for age and gender. The 
representation does not include paths from hierarchy and fatalism, which were as follows: 
Hierarchy → knowledge (  = -.09, p = .09), Hierarchy → Belief ( = .04, p = .30), Hierarchy 
→ Global Warming Risk Perception ( = .02, p = .54), Hierarchy → General Risk 
Perception ( = .13, p < .05), Fatalism → Knowledge ( = .04, p = .37), Fatalism → Belief 
( = .04, p = .22), Fatalism → Global Warming Risk Perception ( = .03, p = .33), Fatalism 



























After controlling for cultural worldviews and demographic variables, the full model 
produced similar results to the previous model. Expert consensus knowledge was the strongest 
predictor of belief in anthropogenic global warming (𝛽 = .63, p < .001), and had a direct effect on 
global warming risk perception. Numeracy predicted expert consensus knowledge, independent of 
cultural worldviews and demographic variables (𝛽 = .13, p < .01). Numeracy was also negatively 
related to domain general risk perception ( = -.20, p < .001), which was positively related to 
global warming risk perception ( = .13, p < .001). Domain general risk perception fully mediated 
the relationship between numeracy and global warming risk perception. 
Numeracy and Relative Risk Attitudes 
A binary logistic regression predicting whether one has above average global warming risk 
perception was constructed. The outcome variable was relative risk perception dichotomized to 
represent whether one’s difference score (between global warming and general risk perception) is 
above the mean or not (Table 20).  
Table 20 
Binary Logistic Regression on Relative Risk Attitudes 
Variable B SE Wald OR 95% CI for OR 
Numeracy 0.17** 0.05 9.96 1.19 1.06, 1.32 
Individualism -0.55*** 0.12 22.00 0.58 0.46, 0.73 
Egalitarianism 0.37*** 0.09 18.84 1.45 1.22, 1.71 
Hierarchy -0.08 0.10 0.67 0.92 0.76, 1.12 
Fatalism -0.09 0.10 0.66 0.92 0.75, 0.13 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.26 1.00 0.99, 1.02 
Gender 0.05 0.20 0.07 1.05 0.71, 1.55 
Note. Dependent variable was relative risk perception dichotomized to represent whether one’s 
relative risk perception (i.e., global warming – general risk perception) is above the mean of the 




As seen in Table 20, statistical numeracy was a significant predictor of relative risk 
perceptions (i.e., global warming risk perception as compared to general risk perception). The odds 
ratio for numeracy was 1.19 with 95% CI [1.06, 1.32], indicating that the odds of having above 
average relative risk perception for individuals with the highest numeracy score was roughly 3.3 
times higher than those with the lowest numeracy score. 
To illustrate the relationship between numeracy and relative risk perceptions, the average 
score for general and global warming risk perception were plotted respectively, with numeracy 
scores (Figure 20, Panel A). Additionally, the predicted difference in global warming risk 
perception and general risk perception (i.e., the latter subtracted from the former) were generated 
(Figure 20, Panel B). For interpretability, the outcome variable was centered around the global 
mean of the risk perception difference. Linear multiple regression with numeracy and cultural 
worldviews as the predictor variables was used. Cultural worldviews were adjusted to their means 




Numeracy and Differences in Risk Perception (Global warming vs. General) 
(a) Risk Perception Difference 
     (General vs. Global Warming) 
(b) Risk Perception Difference 
           (Global warming – General; mean centered)  
Note. Panel A: Average score of general and global warming risk perception by numeracy score 
was plotted. Error bars represent standard errors. Panel B: Predicted differences in the two risk 
perceptions (i.e., global warming risk perception – general risk perception) were plotted. The 
dependent variable was centered around the mean. This linear multiple regression model used 
numeracy and cultural worldview indices as predictor variables, where cultural worldview 
indices were adjusted to each of their means. The shaded area represents 90% confidence 
intervals from 1,000 bootstrap iterations.  
 
As compared to the average risk perception difference, highly numerate individuals tended 
to have higher concern for global warming, whereas less numerate individuals showed less 
variation in responses to risk perceptions (i.e., small differences between general risk perceptions 




 Study 2: Summary 
Five key findings of Study 1 were replicated in Study 2: A larger proportion of people as 
compared to Study 1 had accurate expert consensus knowledge and belief in anthropogenic global 
warming. Numeracy predicted expert consensus knowledge, and the integrated model suggested 
that numeracy had direct and indirect effects on the key outcome variables (i.e., belief and risk 
perception) independent of cultural worldviews. Relatively robust downstream benefits of 
numeracy on the key outcomes were observed (see Figure 21). Again, knowledge robustly 
predicted both belief and risk perception, exceeding the predictive power of main cultural 
worldview indices (e.g., individualism, egalitarianism). The set of integrated models that included 
general risk perception further suggested that numeracy was negatively related to general attitudes 
about risks (i.e., general risk perception), through which it had an indirect effect on risk attitude 
(i.e., global warming risk perception). 
 55 
Figure 21 
Numeracy, Knowledge, Belief, and Risk Perceptions 
 
 The results indicate that although numerate individual may report only slightly higher 
levels of absolute climate change risk perceptions, when compared to all risks in general, results 
indicate that numerate people find the relative risk of climate change to be much higher as 
compared to less numerate individuals.  
Note. Each bar represents relative magnitude of odds ratio at three different scores of numeracy   
(i.e., low = 0, mid = 3, high = 7) for having expert consensus knowledge, believing in 
anthropogenic global warming, having above average global warming risk perception, and 
having above-average relative risk perception (i.e., global warming – general risk perception).  
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
The current set of studies are the first to test an integrated model of the psychological 
interrelations among general decision making skills (i.e., statistical numeracy and risk literacy), 
cultural worldview orientations, climate science knowledge, climate change beliefs, climate risk 
attitudes, and relative risk perceptions. Both studies were conducted with diverse adult participants 
living in the United States who varied widely and representatively with respect to essential 
demographic variables, including age, education, ethnicity, and gender. Results from both studies 
revealed a consistent and clear view of the underlying structure of interrelations among the 
variables. Given the many notable empirical findings, below I present a list of key findings, 
followed by a discussion of practical and theoretical implications.   
(i) Most people tended to agree that there is broad consensus among experts that 
human activities are largely the cause of global warming.  
(ii) Most people agreed that human activities were causing global warming.  
(iii) Worldviews were not strongly related to whether or not someone agreed with 
human caused climate change or expert consensus.  
(iv) Worldviews were mostly related to differences in how strongly people agreed with 
human caused climate change or expert consensus. 
(v) Accurate knowledge about climate science (e.g., expert consensus about global 
warming) was by far the strongest predictor of differences in climate change beliefs 
and risk attitudes (e.g., 5-40 times more predictive power than specific 
worldviews). 
(vi) On average highly numerate people were about 4 times more likely than less 
numerate people to have accurate knowledge and beliefs and were about 3 times 
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more likely to express above-average concerns about the relative risks of climate 
change.  
(vii) Numeracy tends to robustly predict meaningful differences in whether or not 
people are likely to agree with human-caused global warming and expert 
consensus.  
(viii) Numeracy is related to quantitative differences in the strength of agreement or 
disagreement with human-caused global warming and expert consensus. 
(ix) The relationship between numeracy and risk attitudes tends to be indirect and so is 
unlikely to be evident in studies that neglect differences in knowledge or general 
risk perceptions. 
(x) Numeracy tends to be related to lower general risk perceptions, such that numerate 
people are much more worried about climate change than they are about other 
risks, whereas less numerate people report that climate change is not much more 
worrying as compared to other risks in general.   
(xi) There is no evidence of polarization as a function of worldview interactions with 
numeracy or with knowledge. 
(xii) The influence of worldviews on beliefs and attitudes is largely, but not entirely, 
mediated by differences in knowledge (e.g., individualists are somewhat less 
knowledgeable than egalitarians).  
 
Knowledge is Power 
I found that knowledge tends to be the strongest predictor of belief and attitude about global 
warming risk perception. As such, the overall average predictive power of knowledge in the current 
study far exceeded that of any other factor, on average explaining approximately 20% more 
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variance than individual cultural worldview measures. Although the current study relied on only 
one relatively blunt self-report knowledge item to assess differences in understanding of expert 
consensus knowledge, the considerable predictive strength of the relation between knowledge and 
downstream beliefs and risk attitudes is noteworthy and consistent with some previous research.  
To the extent that the finding generalizes, it suggests that one of the single most important factors 
that is likely to determine the accuracy of one’s climate change beliefs is the accuracy of one’s 
understanding about the state of the science of climate change. This phenomenon is consistent with 
a Knowledge is Power hypothesis as described in Skilled Decision Theory—a theoretical 
psychological account of the primary cognitive mechanisms that tend to give rise to superior 
decision making in expert and non-expert reasoners (Cokely et al., 2018).  In short, in addition to 
essential roles of general cognitive skills and deliberative heuristic use, the major source of 
differences in decision making quality tend to reflect differences in the extent to which decision 
makers have a representative understanding of the relevant knowledge, including domain specific 
understanding of material facts (e.g., climate science) and domain-general understanding of their 
own constraints and capabilities (e.g., a well-developed metacognitive sense of one’s own personal 
values, feelings, skills, beliefs, biases, preferences, and responsibilities). To the extent that the 
findings generalize, efforts to provide transparent and accurate information about facts in the world 
including science, as well as efforts to enhance public understanding about information and risks 
may help individuals make better decisions. 
Numeracy Does Not Polarize 
I discovered that numeracy tends to predict accurate acquired knowledge and beliefs about 
climate change, independent of other variables that are known to induce biases in views about 
climate change. Consistent with Skilled Decision Theory, it suggests that numeracy tends to 
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promote acquisition of accurate knowledge, independent of factors that may induces biases, even 
in the domain of substantial controversy. Previous research suggests that climate change tends to 
have unique challenges that can impede the formation of accurate knowledge or beliefs (Hulme, 
2015; van der Linden, 2015a; Weber & Stern, 2011). For example, experiential feedback on 
individuals’ decisions based on their knowledge and beliefs are not always sufficient or immediate. 
In some cases, the consequences may even seem personally irrelevant because the implications of 
climate change may have separate dimensions (e.g., personal vs. societal). In these and other ways, 
climate change may provide an appropriate context for testing relations between factors that may 
shape biases in knowledge and belief, which may generalize to other controversial issues. 
In both studies the model indicated that part of the relationship between worldviews and 
numeracy was complicated by the fact that knowledge largely (but not completely) mediated the 
relations between worldviews, beliefs, and attitudes. Considering the obvious presence of this 
robust relationship and other potential confounds of previous studies, there is good reason to think 
any potential interactions between numeracy and polarization are likely to generally be trivial or 
remarkably small (e.g., weak effects over a narrow subset of vulnerable individuals).  Even if we 
assume the presence of an interaction effect that matched the strength of the reported interactions 
in the literature, the linear relationship between numeracy and knowledge was found to be about 
19 times larger than the estimated magnitude of the significant interaction effects that have been 
reported in previous studies.  To the extent that this robust relationship with numeracy and 
acquisition of accurate knowledge generalizes, even assuming the potential presence of previously 
reported interaction and bias, proper training efforts for statistical numeracy and effective 
transparent (understandable) climate knowledge risk communications seem likely to readily 
overcome small theoretical biases (Chen, 2020; Ybarra et al., 2017).  
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Limitations and Conclusions 
As in all studies there are some notable limitations in the current study.  First, although the 
measurements used in the present study appear to robustly capture differences in knowledge and 
beliefs, these assessments are based on single questions and thus there may be considerable room 
for future improvement. For example, developing a standardized psychometric measure for various 
priors (e.g., knowledge, general risk perceptions, social circle beliefs) with increased sensitivity 
that is also robust to threats like differential item functioning, may help parse out guessing and 
provide a higher-fidelity assessment of the differences, sources and causes of individuals 
differences, as well as the potential benefits of various interventions (e.g., how much better is risk 
communication A vs. B).  This type of detailed development and standardization offers a host of 
benefits, allowing for both more detailed and more robust comparisons across different studies. It 
may also provide more precise estimates of the underlying causal dependencies as estimated in 
integrated cognitive models of the structural associations that shape biases and resiliency. 
Ultimately, these measures may facilitate development and evaluation of training efforts for 
promoting people’s understanding about climate change and other risks. Indeed, given that the 
current investigation is a correlational study, these kind of instruments may prove particularly 
useful to the extent researchers want to validate the observed model (or test its robustness) via 
different experimental manipulations or training programs, with different groups and sub-
populations.   
Overall, the finding that numeracy robustly predicts accurate climate change knowledge 
and beliefs was only possible because of this integrated approach to testing a cognitive model of 
the structural relations. In some sense, failing to sample all the relevant variables may be a bit like 
failing to collect responses from a representative sample of people: Biased sampling of people, 
 61 
processes, or materials tends to result in distorted and biased interpretations, which could further 
complicate public views about the trustworthiness of science in general (Brunswik, 1955; Dhami 
et al., 2004). Biased sampling of risk attitude measures also emerged as a likely confound in other 
previous research. Numerate people showed a very large relative magnitude in climate risk 
perception (how bad is climate change compared to other risk), whereas less numerate people who 
often appeared to be almost as worried about climate change as numerate individuals were found 
to simply be more worried about all risks in general. This finding may be consistent with the notion 
that numerate people, who are in turn more risk literate may have a better understanding of the 
risks they face in the work, as well as any potential benefits or costs associated with different 
courses of action. More generally, a representative sampling of people, processes, and priors may 
be necessary to develop and validate a representative understanding of the social, political, and 
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Items Used for Measuring Cultural Worldview  
 
4 The item was excluded from the analysis. 
Measurement Scale 
Individualism  
The government puts far too many restrictions on what businesses and individuals can 
do. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Egalitarianism 
 
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of wealth more 
equal. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Society works best if power is shared equally. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Hierarchy  
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Society would be much better off if the people in charge imposed strict and swift 
punishment on those who break the rules. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
Fatalism  
The most important things that take place in life happen by chance. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces 
beyond our control. 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance.4 
1 (Strongly disagree) – 
6 (Strongly agree) 
